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Because it is important to understand why
the Social Security system and similar systems
in other countries are stressed, I begin with some
basic facts about population growth. World pop-
ulation has more than doubled in the past 50
years, and has nearly quadrupled since 1900. A
recent forecast from the United Nations, however,
predicts that world-population growth will be
slowing due to falling fertility. U.N. forecasters
predict that, by mid-century, the world average
fertility rate—that is, the average number of chil-
dren a woman will bear in her lifetime—will have
fallen to 1.85. At that rate, fertility will be below
the replacement rate—the level considered nec-
essary for population to stay constant—of about
2.1 children per woman. Consequently, world
population is actually expected to begin declining
sometime toward the end of this century.
This worldwide trend took root in developed
countries where fertility rates are already well
below its replacement rate. In fact, among large
developed countries, only the United States still
has a fertility rate above the replacement rate.
These changes have largely been driven by the
countries’ prosperity: As countries become more
prosperous, women tend to marry and have chil-
dren later in life, resulting in fewer children over
their lifetimes.
Although dramatic, the ongoing fertility
trends in developed countries are not solely
responsible for the projected fall in the world
fertility rate. After all, these countries make up
only about 20 percent of the world’s population.
Instead, it is rapid economic growth in develop-
W
hen I travel to give a speech, on
whatever topic, I often find that
the subject of Social Security
comes up in the Q&A session
after the speech. Because I have received so
many questions on the topic over the years, I’ve
decided that Social Security would be a good
subject for careful treatment in a speech. More-
over, I’m convinced that the most logical audience
for the topic is a young audience. That may sur-
prise you, but I’m hoping that by the end of my
remarks you will agree that Social Security is
actually more of an issue for you than it is for
those currently receiving Social Security benefits.
Moreover, the issue is one for you today, and
not just looking forward to your own retirement.
The reason, in short, is that income you earn
today in your part-time and summer jobs as stu-
dents, and that you will earn when you graduate,
will be subject to Social Security taxes. Current
projections are that those taxes may have to rise
dramatically to sustain the system. And, having
paid those taxes, it is likely that the benefits you
receive when you retire will represent a very
low rate of return on your contributions to the
Social Security system.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments; Howard Wall, assistant vice president in
the research division, provided extensive assis-
tance. However, I retain full responsibility for
errors.ing countries, including the two most populous—
India and China—that is generating the world-
level trend. The case of China, in particular,
illustrates how rapidly population trends can be
altered. Partly as a result of rapid economic growth
and partly because of the Chinese government’s
one-child policy, the fertility rate in China is now
about 1.7, well below replacement rate. As a
result, China’s population is projected to reach a
peak about 2030 and then to begin shrinking.
A decline in the birth rate obviously means
that population growth will slow. But no fancy
calculations are required to understand that a
sharp decline in the birth rate will also create an
imbalance in a population; the decline in the
number of young people inevitably means that
the proportion of older people in the population
will rise. As a consequence, while the world’s
population growth has slowed, there has, there-
fore, also been an aging of the population.
A good summary measure of a population’s
age is the median age—the age such that half the
population is older and half is younger. Over the
last half century, the median age of the world’s
population has increased by 2.8 years, from 23.6
in 1950 to 26.4 in 2000. The U.N. forecasts median
age to rise to 36.8 years in 2050. More developed
countries are expected to have an increase in
median age from 37.3 years to 45.2 years, and
lesser developed countries from 24.1 years to
35.7 years. Japan is today the country with the
oldest population, having a median age of 41.3
years. Japan is projected to have a median age of
53.2 years in 2050.
WHY POPULATION AGING IS SO
IMPORTANT
Relatively few people seem to understand
why population aging is so important. So let me
present to you a highly simplified example to get
the point across.
Suppose we have a country with a stable
population in a long-run steady state, which
means that the situation repeats itself year after
year. Assume that there are one million births
each year, that everyone goes to work at age 20,
that each individual retires at age 60 and then
dies at age 70. The example is obviously highly
artificial, but that fact does not affect the argument
I am about to make, because for present purposes
the distribution of deaths at various ages above
and below age 70 doesn’t matter. And I’ll assume
that everyone works during the working years
from age 20 to age 60.
Because each person goes to work at age 20
and retires at age 60, each person works for 40
years. Because the number of births is one million
per year, at any given time there are one million
20-year old persons, one million 21-year old per-
sons, and so forth up to one million 59-year old
persons. Thus, the total number of working per-
sons at any given time is 40 million.
With one million births per year, the total
number of young dependents from age 0 to age
19 is 20 million. Because people retire at age 60
and die at age 70, there are 10 million retired
dependents. Thus, the total number of nonwork-
ing dependents, young and old together, is 30
million. The 40 million working persons have to
support themselves and the 30 million depend-
ents. If we just use the example of food supply,
the 40 million persons have to produce enough
food for 70 million persons.
Now suppose that a breakthrough in medicine
allows everyone to live to age 80 instead of age
70. However, assume that people continue to
retire at age 60. In 10 years the retired dependent
population grows to 20 million persons. The total
number of dependents, young and old, grows to
40 million persons. The working population of
40 million must now support itself plus 40 mil-
lion dependents, a total of 80 million persons.
The dependency burden on workers has risen
substantially.
What does the increase in the dependency
burden mean to working people? Assuming they
were as productive and hard-working as they
could be in the initial situation, they now have
to reduce their own consumption to leave enough
food and other goods for the increased number
of dependents. The total food supply has to be
spread among more people; average food con-
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food must be spread among 80 million persons
instead of 70 million.
The calculation I just made assumed that the
reduction in food per capita was spread equally
across the entire population. But suppose we
wanted to keep the food supply per person
unchanged for both young and elderly depend-
ents. Then, working people would have to reduce
consumption enough that the increased number
of elderly persons could consume an unchanged
amount per year. If you make the calculation,
you’ll find that working people would have to
reduce their own consumption by 25 percent.
The argument applies to all consumption goods
and not just to food.
Clearly, increased life expectancy in recent
years is presenting exactly this sort of challenge
to our society. If the retirement age remains
unchanged, and the average annual pension also
remains unchanged, and society continues to pro-
vide an unchanged level of goods and services,
including schooling, to the young, then working
people will have to reduce their consumption
significantly. Elderly retirees will enjoy an
unchanged standard of living, at the expense of
working people who have to produce all the goods
consumed by themselves and society’s elderly
dependents.
But, the situation the United States and other
developed countries face is even more difficult
than my example has illustrated so far. The rea-
son is that not only has life expectancy risen but
also the birth rate has declined. To illustrate the
importance of this effect, consider a modification
to my simple example.
The exercise we just discussed had one mil-
lion births per year and each person lived to age
80. Now suppose the number of births declines
suddenly to one-half million per year. This is a
large decline, but in fact not far out of line with
experience in some countries over the last 50
years. For the first 20 years, the number of young
dependents declines. That decline is a net plus
for working people, as they must support fewer
young dependents. However, 21 years after the
decline in the birth rate the number of working
age people begins to decline. In that first year,
one million persons retire but only one-half mil-
lion persons join the work force. As long as the
birth rate remains low, year after year the work
force declines, while the number of retired per-
sons does not begin to decline for another 40 years.
Because the number of working persons
declines steadily, if there is no reduction in the
consumption level of retired persons working
persons must reduce their consumption year
after year. Eventually, after 40 years, the work
force is cut in half, to 20 million people, while
the elderly dependent population remains at 20
million. There are also 10 million young depend-
ents. Thus, the work force of 20 million persons
must support itself plus a total of 30 million
dependents.
With the sharp decline in the birth rate start-
ing in about 1960, the United States and other
developed countries face exactly this situation.
As the baby boom generation retires, the number
of elderly dependents will rise relative to the
number of working age persons. For the United
States, the elderly dependency ratio has risen
from 0.17 in 1960 to 0.21 in 2000. The ratio is
projected to continue to increase, to 0.37 in 2040,
or more than double the 1960 ratio. The depend-
ency ratio is defined here as the ratio of popula-
tion 65 and over to the working age population.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
THE GRAYING POPULATION
When a country has a stable population in a
steady state, as in the first artificial example I
constructed, a pension system can work quite
easily. In my first example, you will recall, each
person had a working life of 40 years and a retired
life of 10 years. Essentially, income received over
40 years had to support consumption over 50
years. Ignoring compound interest for simplicity,
saving $5,000 for each year of the working life
would create a retirement nest egg of $200,000,
which could then be spent at the rate of $20,000
per year for 10 retired years.
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invested in bonds. Then, as a retired person sold
bonds worth $20,000 each year, working age per-
sons would be buying the same bonds to accumu-
late their nest eggs. The process works smoothly,
because there are four working persons for each
retired person. Thus, four working persons each
saving $5,000 per year buy $20,000 worth of
bonds, or exactly the amount being sold by each
retired person.
But this process doesn’t work smoothly when
the age distribution of the population becomes
unbalanced. In my artificial example, when the
birth rate is cut in half, eventually there are only
half as many working persons as before but for a
time the same number of retired persons as before.
Thus, when a retired person sells $20,000 worth
of bonds, there are only two working persons to
buy the bonds. One possibility is that each work-
ing person buys $10,000 worth of bonds each year,
instead of the $5,000 each person expected to
save for retirement. Or, perhaps retired persons
find that they cannot sell $20,000 worth of bonds
each year, because their effort to do so depresses
bond prices. If working persons refuse to buy
more than $5,000 worth of bonds each year, then
bond prices fall so that each retired person only
ends up selling $10,000 worth of bonds, which
cuts in half the standard of living for retired
persons.
These consequences are unpleasant—that
each working person, or each retired person, or
both—end up with a standard of living below
what had been expected. But, unfortunately, these
consequences are an inevitable result of the
change in the age distribution of the society given
the assumption that people retire at age 65.
In the analysis so far, I have said nothing
about Social Security. Any pension arrangement,
public or private or mixed, must somehow deal
with a changing age distribution in the society.
The illustrative calculations we’ve just reviewed
apply independently to private and public retire-
ment arrangements, whether through individual
savings, corporate or university retirement plans,
or government plans such as Social Security. A
large shift toward an older age distribution may
make it impossible for both public and private
pension systems to keep their promises. Or, it
may be possible to keep the promises only by
imposing a much larger burden on the working
population than had previously been expected.
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
Now I’ll turn to a more explicit discussion of
the policy consequences of the graying of the
population on government pension systems—
Social Security in the United States. Specifically,
I will discuss the consequences of our Social
Security system being a pay-as-you-go system,
which means that benefits paid to retirees come
from taxes paid by people who are working cur-
rently. Keep in mind, though, that the U.S. Social
Security system would be strained even if it
were fully funded rather than a pay-as-you-go
system, because someone must buy the assets
sold by a fully funded system to meet its pension
obligations.
With a pay-as-you-go system, as the popula-
tion of a country ages, the number of elderly
persons receiving benefits rises relative to the
number of working-aged persons who pay taxes.
As a result, the average taxpayer must shoulder a
larger and larger tax burden to support the pension
system. Alternatively, retirement benefits must
be cut either by raising the retirement age or by
cutting the annual pension, or some combination.
When a worker pays Social Security taxes, the
money is not put into a fund to collect interest
until the worker retires. Instead, most of the money
is used to pay the benefits of existing retirees.
Only the surplus is put into the Social Security
trust fund. In 2003, for example, Social Security
benefit payments to retirees accounted for 89
percent of the revenue collected in taxes. In other
words, only 11 cents of every dollar in Social
Security taxes paid by current workers was put
away to help pay for the future retirement benefits.
An optimist would point to the other side of
this fact: The amount paid by workers in Social
Security taxes exceeds the benefits being paid
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growing. As long as the fund continues to grow,
everything will be fine. But this optimism is
short-sighted because before long the number of
people receiving Social Security benefits will be
growing faster than the number of people of work-
ing age. Specifically, the elderly dependency
ratio—the ratio of the population aged 65 and
over to the population aged between 20 and 64—
will rise rapidly in coming years as those born
during the baby boom of 1946-1964 come of
retirement age.
So, although the Social Security trust fund is
currently generating a surplus, it is, in fact, in
actuarial deficit because the system will be unable
to fund future Social Security commitments.
Under current projections, without changes to
tax and/or benefit levels, by 2018 the Social
Security system will begin receiving less in taxes
than it pays out in benefits. If adjustments are
not made to benefit levels, the trust funds will
soon need to be bolstered through higher taxes
on those who will be working—which, presum-
ably, will include most of you.
There has been some careful work on this
subject by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), an organi-
zation comprised of economically advanced
democratic countries, including the United States.
OECD projections indicate that public transfers
to retired persons for pensions and health care
will increase in the average OECD country by 6
percent of GDP, from 21 percent to 27 percent,
between now and 2050. Unless promised future
benefits are cut significantly, substantial tax
increases will be necessary to effect such transfers.
However, as a recent OECD report concludes,
drastic tax increases could make matters worse
by reducing the incentives for market work and
for saving.1 Indeed, the OECD concludes that in
many countries it may be necessary both to reduce
promised benefits and to increase the incentives
for work.
The United States, therefore, is certainly
not alone in facing a significant challenge—the
U.S. Social Security system faces the same
demographics-driven problems as other countries.
For the time being, the U.S. fertility rate is above
the replacement rate, but fertility is projected to
begin falling within the next couple of years. In
addition, between now and 2050, the median
age in the United States is expected to rise from
35 years to close to 40 years. As a consequence
of these trends, policymakers in the United States
face the same choice as those of other countries:
increase the Social Security tax burden on the
working population, or reduce Social Security
benefit levels, or some combination.
BACK TO THE ROOTS
To understand the roots of the present situa-
tion, it is illustrative to look at the formative years
of the Social Security system. In the midst of the
Great Depression, the Social Security program
was designed as a pay-as-you-go system so that
benefits could be paid as soon as possible to
retirees to provide them with some measure of
basic income support. Social Security taxes were
first levied in January 1937, and revenues were
placed into a special trust fund. Under the origi-
nal Social Security Act, monthly benefit payments
were to begin in 1942; soon after it was enacted,
the Social Security Act was amended to bring
the vesting date forward to 1940.
Our present collision course began with the
first Social Security payments. The first monthly
retirement check was issued on January 31, 1940,
to Ida May Fuller of Ludlow, Vermont. Over the
three years that she contributed to the Social
Security program, she paid a total of $24.75 in
Social Security taxes. Her initial monthly check
of $22.54 accounted for nearly all of the taxes
she paid into the system, and she would go on to
collect nearly $23 thousand in Social Security
benefits over the rest of her life—more than 900
times the amount that she had contributed.
This example illustrates how the Social
Security system has always been more of a
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1 OECD. “Strengthening Growth and Public Finances in an Era of Demographic Change.” May 2004.straight income-transfer program than a funded
pension scheme. It was easy to make the system
work in its early years because the labor force
paying Social Security taxes into the trust fund
was large relative to the number of beneficiaries
receiving pensions. Over time, though, the num-
ber of those eligible to receive benefits grew rela-
tive to the number of those at work and paying
taxes into the trust fund.
If it weren’t for the significant demographic
transformations that have occurred since the
passage of the Social Security Act, the Social
Security system would probably be not much
different from any other income-transfer pro-
gram: Taxes would be levied on one group of the
population so that payments can be made to
another group. In the early 1930s, U.S. Govern-
ment forecasters predicted that at the end of the
20th century our nation’s population would total
some 145 to 150 million persons. The forecasters
didn’t count on the baby boom that came along
after World War II, however, and their forecast
turned out to be way off: By 2000, U.S. population
had passed 280 million.
For many years, therefore, the large working
population created by the baby boom could eas-
ily support a relatively small retired population
of people born before 1946. Note especially that
the cohort of persons born during the Great
Depression of the 1930s was relatively small.
Now the tables are turning, as the first of the
baby boom generation retires. The relatively
smaller generations born after 1960 will be the
work force supporting a large number of elderly
dependents.
WHAT TO DO
This discussion should make clear that the
fundamental problem our society—and all aging
societies—face is not fundamentally a financial
problem but instead a problem of an excessive
number of retired people relative to working
people. This is a problem we can solve, and it is
really a happy problem in many ways. We are
living longer and in much better health—that
can’t be a problem!
Nevertheless, an implication of living longer
should not be that younger people have to bear
the entire burden of providing goods retirees will
consume for those additional years. Would I ask
my own children, who have their own problems
of supporting themselves and their families, to
support me so I can enjoy a life of retired leisure
of many years of travel and sailing, which are two
of my passions? I wouldn’t do that looking my
own children in the eye; nor am I going to look
you in the eye and argue that you should pay
an increasing tax burden to support me at an
unchanged level of benefits for my relatively
long life expectancy. And I don’t think we as a
society should collectively ask the younger gen-
eration to support all the additional years of
retirement of the baby boom generation that
modern medicine makes possible.
Unless those in my generation and the baby-
boom generation want to place a huge tax burden
on our children and grandchildren, we need to
adopt some combination of the only two possible
solutions. One is to reduce the annual payments
to Social Security beneficiaries, and the other is
to reduce the number of retirement years by rais-
ing the retirement age. These changes—whatever
mix the country decides it prefers—should be
phased in gradually, to avoid an undue impact
on those who are close to retirement today. My
own preference is to concentrate on raising the
retirement age for full benefits, given that people
are healthy and productive much longer than
they used to be.
For a man with average income, our Social
Security System is roughly neutral between ages
62 and 67. Beyond that age, however, the incentive
to remain in the labor force is low. Put another
way, the implicit tax of remaining in the labor
force—foregone benefits—is relatively high. At a
technical design level, there are a number of pos-
sible ways to create a more neutral system with
respect to retirement age, so that at a minimum
those who want to work longer are not penalized
for doing so. The idea is that annual benefits need
to be higher by an actuarially fair amount when
retirement is delayed. By continuing to work past
normal retirement age, people support themselves
ECONOMIC GROWTH
6and pay taxes that help to reduce the tax burden
that would otherwise fall on others.
The United States has in place a gradual
increase in the retirement age for full Social
Security benefits from age 65 to age 67 by 2025.
Our Social Security System was begun in the
1930s when the average 65-year-old person could
expect to live about an additional 13 years; by
2000, those additional years at age 65 had risen
to about 18. It makes sense that we lift the age of
eligibility for Social Security payments in recog-
nition of the increase in our expected life spans.
However, it is clear that the increase in normal
retirement age from 65 to 67 that is in current law
does not go far enough to solve the problem.
It’s worth noting that there is nothing sacro-
sanct about the retirement age, which has been
determined largely by tradition rather than demo-
graphic trends. In 1881, the German government
under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck designed
the world’s first old-age insurance system and
chose 70 as the retirement age. At the time, life
expectancy at birth in Germany was only 45 years.
When the committee designing the U.S. Social
Security system was deciding on a retirement
age, committee members were guided by the
retirement ages used by the 30 state-level systems
that were already in place. Roughly half used 65
as the retirement age, while the other half used
70. At the time, the average life expectancy at birth
was about 60 years, but is now about 78 years.
The OECD has recommended a number of
other reforms to its member countries to encourage
older persons to remain active participants in the
labor force. These include removing labor market
rigidities that discourage part-time employment,
and implementing reforms that would increase
the share of retirement income from private
sources relative to public pay-as-you-go systems.
Such policy reforms could help alleviate the fis-
cal challenges posed by aging populations both
by lowering dependency ratios and by favoring
economic growth.
CONCLUSION
Demographic change in the United States
and elsewhere in the world presents enormous
challenges. In much of the world, the combination
of increased life expectancy and a reduced birth
rate has created a situation in which the popula-
tion is becoming unbalanced in its age distribu-
tion. We know this problem is right ahead of us,
because the people have already been born. I
hope I have convinced you that Social Security
is not just a problem you will have to deal with
when you come close to retirement age, but one
you will have to address within a few years. An
even more pressing problem, which I have not
discussed today, is the Medicare system. Taxes
to support retirement programs will fall on you,
and not on those already retired. Retirees will
face the possibility of benefit cuts, to be sure, but
you will face the possibility of tax increases. We
are truly all in this situation together, and we
had better find a way to deal with it together.
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